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McGinnis: Applying the Administrative Procedure Act to Federal Parole Decis

APPLYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT1
TO FEDERAL PAROLE DECISION MAKING
CAMPBELL McGINNIS

Seeking to protect the interests of society, the criminal justice system has
increasingly aimed at rehabilitating the offender and returning him as a productive member of society.2 Rehabilitation is important since virtually all
prisoners eventually will be released to society.3 Parole, 4 as a method of
obtaining conditional liberty, is a significant tool in the process of rehabilitation, enabling parole authorities to reintegrate the offender when society's
interests can best be served.
The United States Board of Parole administers the granting of parole under a federal statute which allows wide discretion in the performance of this
function. 5 Since prolonged incarceration may inhibit rehabilitation, 6 the
proper functioning of the parole system is essential. Whether an offender
emerges from his peno-correctional experience as a greater threat to society
than when he was incarcerated may depend largely on how each offender
perceives the measure of justice and fairness he has received. 7 Abuses in
the parole process, therefore, clearly have an adverse effect on rehabilitating
offenders and present strong justification for court intervention in the parole
process.
Federal courts have traditionally taken a "hands off" approach to the
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970). Since its enactment in 1946, the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) has been a major impetus to the opening of federal agency ac-

tion to public scrutiny.

2. Courts recognize that "[r]etribution is no longer the dominative objective of
the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals of criminal jurisprudence." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971).
3. O'Leary, Issues and Trends in Parole Administration in the United States, 11
AM. CalM. L. REv. 97 (1972).
4. Parole has been defined to include two elements:
(1) a decision by an authority constituted according to statute to determine the
portion of the sentence which the inmate can complete outside of the institution
and (2) a status-the serving of the remainder of the sentence in the community,
according to the rules and regulations promulgated by the parole board.
Hearings on H.R. 13118 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, pt. VII-A, at 500 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
5. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).
6. Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 31 n.128 (1968).
7. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J.
CalM. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964).
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parole process and have never overturned a decision to deny parole.8 Until
recently specific provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, which seem
to require judicial review, have not been applied. The Parole Board has
not complied with the provisions of the APA and contends that the entire
Act is inapplicable 9 because it is not an "agency" as that term is used in
the APA. The Parole Board argues that it is not an "agency" because Congress never intended that the function of administering criminal justice be
subject to APA, and in support of this proposition points out that the Board
is never mentioned in the Act nor in the Congressional debates preceding
the passage of the APA. 10
Though dicta in early cases supports the Parole Board's arguments," the
recent opinions of King v. United States' 2 and Pickus v. United States Board
of Parole"s have rejected them and applied two APA provisions. These
cases, reinforced by legislative intent and a growing need for procedural
modifications of parole system, have opened the door to new applications
of the APA. The quality of the Parole Board's criteria for granting parole
and individual decisions to grant or deny parole can be materially improved
by application of the APA. The purposes of this comment are to determine
whether the APA applies to the Board of Parole, to identify major problems in parole decision-making procedure, and to examine the extent of applicability of selected APA provisions to those problems.
FEDERAL PAROLE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING
GRANT OR DENIAL OF PAROLE

Eligibility for parole in the federal system is determined by statutory parameters, the offender's status, and the type of sentence rendered.' 4 In most
instances adult offenders eligible for parole must file a written application.'
Juvenile delinquents and youth offenders, however, are expressly prohibited
from making application for parole, and must appear instead before a hear8. See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View

from Mempa v. Rhay, 47A TExAS L. REV. 1, 46 (1968).
9. Johnson, FederalParole Procedures,25 AD. L. REV. 459, 479 (1973).

10. Brief for Appellant at 6-10, Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, Civil No.
73-1987 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 1, 1973).
11. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 236-37 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hiatt v. Compagna,
178 F.2d 42, 47 (5th Cir. 1949).

12. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).

13.

Civil No. 73-1987 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 1, 1973).

14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202, 4209, 5010, 5017, 5032, 5034, 5037 (1970).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970) provides:
If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for release on parole, that there
is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize
the release of such prisoner on parole.
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ing examiner at regular intervals.' 6 Eligible adult prisoners also have a
hearing, more accurately called an interview, conducted in the institution by
a Board member or examiner and attended by prison counsel and a stenographer.1 7 Prior to the hearing, whether for youth offender, juvenile, or
adult, the examiner usually reviews ,the prisoner's file' which is not previewed by or shown to the prisoner, even though selected portions of its contents may be discussed. Upon termination of the interview the examiner
dictates a recommendation which is not shown to the prisoner but is included
in the file and sent to Washington.' 9
The actual decision to grant or deny parole is made in Washington by
two Board members who individually-without consultation-review the prisoner's file, each noting his decision. In the event of disagreement (in approximately 30 percent of the cases) a third member is called, 20 though
cases of unusual difficulty or notoriety may be given original en banc consideration by a majority of the Board. 2' The offender receives written notification of the Board's decision, but not of the reasons for that decision. 22
A review may be conducted by the Parole Board if justified by significant
new information. 2 ' Federal courts generally refuse to grant judicial review.2 s
THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE: AN "AGENCY"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE APA

A prerequisite to the application of any provision of the APA is that the
Parole Board must be definable as an "agency" within the meaning given
in that Act. An "agency," as defined in the Act, "means each authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency .... ,,25 Legislative history, scholarly
16. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (1972).
17. Hearings, pt. VII-A at 579.

18. The main features of a prisoner's file are: pre-sentence report, prior arrest record, parole progress report, and a parole release plan. A more detailed study of Parole
Board files conducted for the Administrative Conference of the United States is re-

printed in Hearings, pt. VII-B at 1458-63.
19. Hearings, pt. VII-A at 579.
20. U.S. BD. OF PAROLE 17, quoted in Hearings, pt. VII-B at 1289. See also Hearings, pt. VII-A at 579.
21. U.S. BD.OF PAROLE 19-23, quoted in Hearings, pt. VII-B at 1293.
22. The decision of the Board may take three forms: 1) it may set a definite date

for parole release; 2) it may continue the case for later review; or 3) it may deny
parole (continue the case to expiration of sentence). U.S. BD. OF PAROLE R. 18; Hearings, pt. VII-B at 1290.
23. U.S. BD. OF PAROLE R. 21; Hearings, pt. VII-B at 1293.
24. See, e.g., Juelich v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 437 F.2d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1971);
Thompkins v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed,
318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

25. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970).
include:

Statutory exceptions to the definition of an agency
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opinion, and judicial decisions support the proposition that this broad definition encompasses the Parole Board.
Legislative History
Although the voluminous legislative history of the Act never specifically
mentions the Parole Board, Congress clearly intended the term "agency" to
include all authorities. During floor debate Representative Walter 26 explained:
The definition of agency in section 2(a) of the bill is perfectly simple
and consists of two elements: First, there are excluded legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities. Secondly, there is included any other
authority regardless of its form or organization. In short, whoever has
the authority
to act with respect to the matters later defined is an
27
agency.
Since Congress has never expressly exempted the Board from the definition
of "agency" 28 and has affirmatively expressed its intention that all authorities be considered agencies, the absence of specific mention of the Board
in Congressional deliberations cannot be considered to exclude it from the
"agency" definition.
The omission of any reference to the Parole Board is completely consistent with the functional definition of "agency" enacted in the APA by Congress. That definition contains no exemptions of agencies as such, but exempts certain functions of all agencies. 29 Although the "criminal process
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

the Congress;
the courts of the United States;
the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States;
the government of the District of Columbia;
agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives or
organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory; or
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of Title 12; chapter 2 of title 41; or sections 1622, 1884, 1891-1902, and former section 1641
(b) (2) of Title 50, appendix; ....

id. § 551(1).
26. Chairman of the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee which reported on the bill later enacted as 'the APA.
27. 92 CONG. REC. H5649 (1946) (Remarks of Representative Walter), quoted in
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 354 (1946).

Beyond this statement, Congress

apparently found the present statutory wording to reflect its understanding, for there
are few additional statements bearing on the definition.
28. Various agencies or agency functions have been exempted from specific provisions of the APA. Examples of exemptions from 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1971), the public
information section, include the Renegotiation Board, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1221 (1951)
and the Selective Service System, 50 U.S.C. § 463(b) (1970).
29. 92 CONG. REc. S2151, S2154-55 (1946) (Remarks of Senator McCarran),
quoted in S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 303, 313 (1946): "The present bill
must be distinguished from the Walter-Logan bill in several essential respects . . . since
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has always been separate from administrative law," 0 the functional definition of an "agency" does not exclude the functions of the Parole Board, since
it makes no distinction between criminal administration agencies and public
regulatory agencies.8 1 Instead, the Act defines "agency" as "each authority." 32 The Senate Judiciary Committee Print of June 1945, explaining a
previously revised text substantially similar to the APA, defines "authority"
as: "[A]ny officer or board whether within another agency or not, which
by law has authority to take final and binding action with or without appeal
to some superior administrative authority. '38 Congress intended, by defining
"agency" functionally in terms of "each authority," to impart the broadest
'34
scope of the definition of "agency."
Scholarly Opinion
Recognizing the intention of Congress as expressed in the Act and its legislative history, legal scholars have also given a broad scope to the term.
Professor Freedman, a noted authority in administrative law, states:
If the legislative history on this point can be said to reflect a dominant
'temper of legislative opinion,' it is a desire to use the term 'agency'
to identify centers of gravity of the exercise of administrative power.
Where a center of gravity lies, where substantial 'powers to act' with
respect to individuals are vested, there is an administrative agency for
purposes of the APA.8 5
Although Professor Davis, another recognized authority, uses a more restrictive definition," he believes the Parole Board is an "agency" within the
meaning of the APA.87 Although these scholars believe that the Parole
it is drawn entirely on a functional basis it contains no exemptions of agencies as

such."
30. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 3.00, at 79 (Supp. 1970).
31. The Probation System is exempted from agency status under the APA, though
its functions are indistinguishable from those of the Parole Board. See Cohen, Due
Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 COLO. L. REV.
197, 225 (1971). This result is reached on the basis of 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (1970)
which exempts the courts, who administer the Probation System.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970).
33.

Senate Judiciary Committee Print of June 1945, quoted in S. Doc. No. 248,

79th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1946).
34. 37

CONG.

REc. S2151 (1946) (Remarks of Senator McCarran), reprinted in S.

Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 305 (1946). Exemptions of agencies from specific
procedural provisions makes the broadest interpretation of "agency" reasonable.

35. Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Invest-

ment, 119 U. PA. L.

REV.

1, 9 (1970); see Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renego-

tiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1973), appeal pending, 42 U.S.L.W. 3502

(Feb.25, 1974).
36. 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.01, at 1 (1958), where he
states: "An administrative agency is a governmental authority other than a court and
other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making." Id. § 1.01, at 1.
37. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 129 (1969).
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Board is an agency, final responsibility for interpreting the Act rests with
courts.3 8

Judicial Decisions
39
While recognizing a lack of clarity in the definition of an "agency,"
federal case law clearly indicates the Parole Board is an "agency." In the

leading case of Soucie v. David,40 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, though not dealing specifically with the Parole Board, has
defined "agency" as: "The statutory definition of 'agency' is not entirely

clear, but the APA apparently confers agency status on any administrative
unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions."'41 Although earlier cases held specific procedures of the Board exempt
from the operation of the APA, they did not consider whether the Board
is an "agency" nor hold the entire Act inapplicable. 42 The two recent cases
that have considered the issue of agency have held that the Parole Board
is an "agency." In King v. United States43 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit applied a specific provision of the APA to the Board, stating
that "[t]here is no language in the APA exempting the Parole Board from
its application. '4 4 Similarly, Pickus v. United States Board of Parole4' di-

rectly held that the U.S. Board of Parole is an "agency" within the meaning of the APA. 46 Because these cases, the scholarly opinion, and congressional intent indicate the Parole Board is an "agency," problems in parole
are exposed to various provisions of the APA.
PROBLEMS INVOLVING PAROLE PROCEDURES:
SEEKING RESOLUTION THROUGH THE

APA

Significant problems in the parole process are not subject to resolution
by judicial challenge. 47 Parole decision-making procedure, however, is an
38. See generally Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955); Renegotiation Bd.
v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., - U.S. -, -,
94 S. Ct. 1028, 1034-38, - L. Ed. 2d
-, (1974).
39. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 714 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
40. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 1073. This broad interpretation has been approved in Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Blackwell
College of Business v. Attorney General, 454 F.2d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963);
Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), a!I'd, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
43. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 1343.
45. Civil No. 73-1987 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 1, 1973).
46. Id.
47. Some frequently voiced non-judicial problems are: excessive case load, a long
time lag between the parole hearing and decision, inadequate financing, and inarticulate
offenders.
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area which is subject to judicial scrutiny. With increasing frequency federal
courts are confronted with challenges to parole decision-making procedure
focusing on three critical problem areas: (1) ambiguity of parole criteria;
(2) failure to state the reasons for denial of parole; and (3) arbitrariness in
parole decision-making. 48 The APA may be applied to alleviate problems
in each of these areas.
Ambiguity of Parole Criteria
The enabling statute
prisoner on parole if
[t]here is a reasonable
main at liberty without
Board such release is
49

of the U.S. Parole Board authorizes release of a
probability that such prisoner will live and reviolating the laws, and if in the opinion of the
not incompatible with the welfare of society

These guidelines do not provide specific, criteria for determining individual
cases, and until recently, the Parole Board had never publicly stated any
of the substantive principles upon which its determinations are based. 50
In the present system, considerable progress has been made by the Board
toward specifying the criteria actually used in parole decision-making. In
1971, the Board published an extensive list of general factors considered in
parole selection. The list was of little real value since it did no more than
enumerate items of information typically found in a prisoner's file. 51 More
meaningful guidelines issued by the Parole Board in November 1973 place
a weighted value on each of nine separate factors positively correlated with
success on parole, and classify crimes into six categories according to the
seriousness of ;the offense.5 2 These guidelines provide for a range of months
to be served by each prisoner preceding parole, this length of time depending on the seriousness of his crime and the number of favorable factors
(such as age, marital status, etc.), with which he is credited. While the
48. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON CORRECTIONS Ch. 8 (1967). See also Kimball and
Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat and Response, 14
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1 (1968).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).

50. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 127 (1969). AS recently as 1969, Professor
Davis was thoroughly justified in stating: "The Board has never publicly stated any

substantive principals that guide it in determining the probability that a prisoner will

commit another crime or whether his release will be compatible with the welfare of
society." Id. at 127. In addition to being vague and ambiguous, the statute apparently
gives the Board the authority to rely solely on its own opinion in construing the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).
51. See generally U.S. BD.

B at 1286-88.

OF

PAROLE R. 14-16, quoted in Hearings pt. VII-

Actual criteria used in three state parole systems were enumerated in

Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law
and Practice, 1966 WASH. L.Q. 243.

52. 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-31945 (1973).
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Board states that these guidelines are "merely indicators of how the Board
. . . intends to exercise its discretion . . . ,,, 5 they actually structure priorities in decision-making. It remains to be seen whether -the Parole Board will
actually exercise its discretion in the manner outlined by the 1973 guidelines,5 4 but a study made in 1973 indicates that specific criteria do have
a significant effect on parole decision-making. 5
The recent progress made in specifying certain parole criteria does not
eliminate the need for articulating other factors influencing discretion and
integrating those in the system of priorities. So long as the 'Board can determine whether an offender will have liberty for a substantial portion of his
sentence merely on the basis of ambiguous or unwritten criteria, that offender will continue to feel he lacks influence on self-determination. The
prisoner's belief that he has some measure of control over his own life appears essential to successful rehabilitation. Ambiguity of parole criteria is
part of a larger process contributing to an offender's frustration and adversely influencing his behavior in society.50
This ambiguity is a problem which can be improved but not entirely resolved by application of the APA rule-making provisions. Those provisions
require that general notice of proposed rule-making be published in the Federal Register, 57 and also that the agency give interested persons an opportunity to participate. 58 Additionally, the agency must "incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose." 59 The Parole Board, however, has never published a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. Although rules formulated in accordance
with the APA may still be ambiguous, they will at least have been subjected
to enlightened public and professional comment. Articulation of rules is a
method of self-education within the correctional system which would reveal
both proper and improper grounds for granting or denying parole. 0
,If parole criteria were considered to be either interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency procedure, the rule-making provi53. Id. at 31942-31945.
54. In the first 4 months of a pilot project using the guidelines, "63% of hearing
examiner decisions were within the guidelines, 22.5% were below and 14.5% were
above the guidelines." Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 929 (D. Conn. 1973).
55. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PAROLE DECISION MAKING 40-42 (1973).
56. Hearings,pt. VII-A at 294-96.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
58. Id.§ 553(c).
59. Id. § 553(c).
60. Kimball and Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat
and Response, 14 CRIME & DELIQUENCY 1, 11 (1968). See also Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,
412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969). "Section 553 was enacted to give the public an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. It also enables the agency . . . 'to educate itself before establishing rules and procedures which have a substantial impact
on those regulated." Id. at 744.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol6/iss2/8

8

McGinnis: Applying the Administrative Procedure Act to Federal Parole Decis

[Vol. 6:478

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

sions of the APA would not apply.,' Whether a particular rule falls within
6 2
one of these exceptions is to be determined by its purpose and impact.
If a rule's purpose is to alter a method of operation and its impact is on
the agency's internal systems, then the rule is procedural. The purpose of
parole criteria is to determine when an offender will be released. The impact of that determination has its effect both on the inmate's liberty and
on the protection of society's interests. Such rules are clearly substantive;
they do not affect the agency's internal operation and are thus not excepted
from the Act.
Difficult to define, interpretative rules are probably better known by their
characteristics than by any single definition. 3 These rules usually deal with
the construction of statutes ;64 they are without binding effect upon the persons affected,( " and they lack legislative mandate with respect to their binding authoritative nature.66 Although many of the rules promulgated by the
Parole Board are interpretative, parole criteria are legislative or substantive
in nature. Parole Board rules establishing parole criteria do not construe
a statute except to the extent that they identify the welfare of society; 67 they
are binding on the offender if they are utilized by the Parole Board, and
they do not arise pursuant to a grant of lawmaking power. Clearly, by any
of the indicators, parole criteria are not interpretative rules.
The second exception, "general statements of policy," may be defined as
"approaches to particular types of problems, which, as they become established, are generally determinative of decisions." 68 Agencies often characterize a statement as policy in order to avoid the collateral consequences
of characterization as a policy rule. 69 Courts recognize that "the label that
61. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1970).

62. Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

"The determinative factor

is the context within which the rule was promulgated and, flowing from this context,
the essential purpose of the rule." Id. at 680. "The basic policy of Section 4 at least

requires that when a proposed regulation of general applicability has a substantial im. . . notice and opportunity for comment should first
be provided." Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del.
1970). See also P.B.W. Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973).
63. See generally Bondfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin
the Making of Interpretive Rules and General Statements of Policy under the APA,
23 AD. L. REv. 101 (1971).
64. Id. at 108.

pact on the regulated industry

65. Note, Rulemaking: Some Definitions under the Federal Administrative Proce-

dure Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 491, 497 (1947).
66. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the Making of
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy under the APA, 23 AD. L. REv.
101, 109 (1971).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).
68.
TIVE

ATrORNEY

GENERAL'S

COMM.

ON ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURES IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,

(1941).

PROCEDURE,

ADMINISTRA-

S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 26

69. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the Making of
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the particular agency puts upon its given exercise of administrative power
is not . . . conclusive; rather it is what the agency does in fact."70 Although
the Board characterizes its parole criteria as a "statement of general policy,"' 1 they are, in fact, policy rules because they have prospective influence
affecting an individual decision. Though subject to overriding discretion,
they have a substantive impact on an offender's liberty.
Furthermore, parole criteria are not rules of agency procedure.7 2 They
set forth the substantive criteria which will be used by the Board in performing its statutory function. Arguably, even rules which are clearly procedural
in nature may be subject to the notice and public comment requirements
74
of the APA 73 if their impact on substantive rights is substantial.
The rules of the U.S. Board of Parole relating to parole criteria are clearly
subject to the rule-making provisions of the APA. They are not procedural,
interpretative, or statements of general policy, and their impact on both the
offender and the public is substantial.
Stating the Reasons for Denial of Parole
The Parole Board's practice of refusing to state its reasons for the denial
of parole7 5 has been extensively criticized for at least three reasons. First,
stating reasons for the denial of parole might help to rehabilitate the prisoner through education and guidance toward self-improvement.70 Second,
the reasons might help relieve the frustration resulting from a lack of knowledge of how one is being measured for release. Third, a policy of openness and honesty would be promoted, thereby exposing arbitrariness within
the decision-making process and allowing for the development of a body of
acceptable decision-making formulae."
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy under the APA, 23 AD. L. REv.
101, 109 (1971).
70. Lewis-Motor v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972). See
also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942);
National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96 (D.D.C.

1967), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968).

71. 38 Fed. Reg. 31942 (1973).
72. Cf. Fisher v. FCC, 417 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d
673 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

73. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
74. See, e.g., National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp.
90, 95 (D.D.C. 1967). A procedure to obtain reparations was not exempted from the
APA's notice and public comment provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
75. O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making Characteristics: Report of a National Survey, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 651, 678 (1973); 28 C.F.R. § 2.16 (1972). But see
Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 926 (D. Conn. 1973). The Board is experimenting
with giving the reasons for denial of parole on a limited basis. (5 institutions were
studied). Id. at 926.
76. See Hearings, pt. VII-A at 269. See also K. DAvis, DIScRETIONARY JUSTICE
128 (1969).
77. Hearings,pt. VII-A at 295-96.
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Delineating the reasons for denial of parole is currently inhibited, if not
precluded, by the Board's procedural policy of having its members individually review a prisoner's file.78 Except for infrequent en banc considerations, there is no discussion or agreement by Board members on the basis
for either granting or denying parole. This procedural policy prompted Professor Davis to inquire:
How could a Board member have less incentive to avoid prejudice or
undue haste than by a system in which his decision can never be reviewed and in which no one, not even his colleagues, can ever know
why he voted as he did? Even complete irrationality of a vote can
never be discovered. Should any men, even good men, be unnecessarily trusted with such uncontrolled discretionary power? 79
80
In a recent landmark decision, Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Board,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the state board's policy of refusing to reveal the basis for parole denial was invalid and "should be replaced
. . . by a carefully prepared rule designed generally towards affording statements of reasons on parole denials . . . .81 The Monks decision was not
based on constitutional or statutory grounds, but rather in equity. "[F]airness and rightness clearly dictate the granting of the prisoner's ,request for
a statement of reasons. '8 2 The equities are no less evident in the Fed83
eral Parole System.
Section 555(e) of the APA provides that:
Prompt notice shall be given. . . in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in connection with any agency proceedings. Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice
8 4 shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.
85
A literal interpretation of the statute, as clearly intended by Congress,
would require the Parole Board to state its reasons for the denial of an ap78. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 129 (1969). The Board also refuses to disclose how the Board or any member votes on a particular case. Hearings, pt. VIIB at 1308.
79. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTCE 129 (1969).
80. 277 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1971).
81. Id. at 199.

82. Id. at 199.
83.
JUSTICE,

THE

A

PRESIDENT'S

COMM'N

TASK FORCE REPORT:

ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT

CORRECTIONS 86 (1967).

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF

The Task Force concluded

that reasons for the Board's decision should be given so that meaningful judicial review
can be undertaken. Id. at 86.

84. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970).
85. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1946).

Both the Senate and House

committees have said:

This subsection affords the parties in an agency proceeding, whether or not formal or upon hearings, the right to prompt action upon their requests, immediate
notice of such action, and a statement of the actual grounds therefore. The latter
should in any case be sufficient to appraise the party of the basis of the denial.
Id. at 265; see K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 129 n.49 (1969).
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plication for parole and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit so held
in King v. United States. 6 In that case the court put aside the issue of
whether the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids denial of parole without a stated reason, and directly held that the APA requires the Parole Board to give a brief statement of the grounds for denial
of parole applications. 8 7 The cause was remanded, however, for determina88
tion of whether the palintiff's application was in writing.
In order to be considered for parole, most adult prisoners must make a
written application in accordance with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4203
which states: "If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the
proper institution officers or upon application by a prisoner .,.. the Board

may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole."8 9
Youth offenders and juveniles, however, are expressly prohibited by a Board
rule from applying for parole. 0 This fact should not prohibit compliance
with the written application requirements of the APA. Youths and juveniles are "prisoners," 9 ' and thus the Board rule is in violation of the federal
statutes requiring application for parole. 92 The Board cannot evade its responsibility to provide a brief statement of reasons as required by the APA
by invoking such a rule. In any event, youth offenders and juveniles would
be entitled to a statement of reasons upon written request made after the
parole hearing. 93
The precise nature of the "brief statement" required by the APA is uncertain. The only clarification, presented in King v. United States, 94 is a
recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States that
"there should

. .

.

be . . .at least a sentence or two of individualized ex-

planation." 9 5 Many penologists, however, feel that in-depth particularization is necessary to facilitate rehabilitation. 96 Whether due process also re86. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).

87. Id. at 1345.
88. Id. at 1345.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (1972).
91. Royce v. Salt Lake City, 49 P. 290 (Utah 1897). "A prisoner is a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of a judicial or other lawful process." Id. at 292.
"Treatment" under 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970) for Youth Offenders and "Custody" under
18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1970) provide for substantial deprivations of liberty, usually incarceration. See also State v. Brill, 83 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Wis. 1957).
92. 38 Fed. Reg. 26653 (1973).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970).
94. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
95. Id. at 1340, quoting Administrative Conference Recommendation 72-3: Procedures of the United States Board of Parole, 25 AD. L. REv. 531, 534 (1973). This
recommendation was additional to a check-list form that has been used experimentally
by the Parole Board.
96. These penologists include Representative Katsenmier, Professors V. O'Leary,
Fred Cohen and H. Schwartz, and Mr. Charles Goodell. See Hearings, pt. VII-A at
201-202, 219-20, 241, 296, 602.
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quires a statement of reasons on denial of parole is not settled; but at least
two federal district courts have held that there is such a requirement. 97 One
court has described the statement required in these terms:
It.

.

. must . . . state the ultimate ground of its decision denying pa-

role with sufficient particularity to enable the prisoner to understand
how he is expected to regulate his conduct and to enable a reviewing
court to determine whether inadmissible factors have influenced
the de98
cision, and to determine whether discretion has been abused.
Minimum due process requirements may be more stringent with respect to
stating the grounds for denial of parole than is the "brief statement" required
by the APA.
Arbitrarinessin ParoleDecision-Making
Within very broad guidelines, the Parole Board has discretion to authorize the release of a prisoner on parole. 99 It is this almost unfettered discretion which presents the opportunity for abuse and arbitrariness in the decision to grant or deny parole. Because statutory standards for parole are
vague, it is difficult to determine exactly what constitutes arbitrariness in
the decision-making process. Consideration of an irrelevant or inappropriate
factor presents the only clear cases of abuse which can be substantiated.
The parameters for what is "appropriate" come from the Constitution and
the enabling statute. 10 0 In a study by Professor Gaylin from 1967 to 1970,
it was found that the Parole Board systematically discriminated among conscientious objectors on the basis of their religious denomination.'10 Specifically, Jehovah's Witnesses were considered "True CO's" and therefore
granted parole much earlier than prisoners of other denominations. Such
arbitrary policies have been condemned by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. 10 2 Other inappropriate factors 0 8 which may have 'been considered
by the Parole Board have included: overcrowding in particular correctional
0°5
facilities, 0 4 promises made by the Board during direct plea bargaining, '
97. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of Parole, 363
F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp.
354 (E.D. Penn. 1973).
98. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of Parole, 363
F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).
100. Id.
101. Gaylin, No Exit, Harpers, Nov., 1971, at 87. This is also discussed in Hearings, pt. VII-A at 445-65. See generally Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484
F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1973).
102. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
103. See generally Comment, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 8 HARv. Cxv. RTS.-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (1973).
104. Hearings,pt. VII-A at 145-46.
105. Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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and political pressure.'0 6 The presence of arbitrariness in other categories,
such as failure to consider, a relevant factor, or unreasonable weight given
to a relevant factor, 10 7 is extremely difficult to detect, both because of the
wide discretion that permeates the system and because of the secretive practices of the Parole Board.
Arbitrary parole decisions may contribute substantially to an offender's
belief that he is being treated unfairly, thereby making him a difficult subject for rehabilitation. 08 Realization of the rehabilitative goal depends
greatly upon the extension of rights to prisoners and a system's predictability
attainable only by sufficient procedural safeguards. 109 Discretionary authority should be tempered so that it cannot hide arbitrary methods of decisionmaking.
The most impressive weapon against arbitrariness in decision-making is
judicial review. Despite the overwhelming benefits which might accrue to
the parole system, 110 the judiciary has taken a "hands-off" approach toward
intervention in the correctional process."' The unfortunate result, exemplified by Richardson v. Rivers," 2 is that courts generally refuse to consider
the case even where an abuse of discretion, such as the Parole Board's acting with prejudice, malice and discrimination, is alleged.
The powers of a reviewing court are limited. The nature of judicial review itself is essentially only an overseeing of the criteria and procedures
utilized by the administrative agency in decision-making." 8 This sort of review leaves room for considerable agency discretion, since the substantive
merits of individual decisons "are almost never reviewed in any substantial
way . . . . 114 Furthermore, courts do not have the power to grant pa106. Hearings, pt. VII-A at 413-17.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINSTRATIVE ACTION 180-81, 586 (1965).
108. See Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 485 (1962). See also The National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Correction in the United States, A Survey for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
1, 223 (1967): "[Due] process need not be in conflict with treatment goals, but indeed may be a crucial prerequisite."
109. See Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S., 175, 196 (1964). The crucial relationship between the parole
applicant's subjective view of the system and the system's potential for successful reformation of the offender has long been recognized. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 850
(D.C. Cir. 1946).
110. Some of the benefits which might be expected because of judicial review are:
more articulate rules, more open procedures, and less arbitrariness in decision-making.
111. See Juelich v. United States Bd. of Parole, 437 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1971);
Thompkins v. United States Bd. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.1968).
112. 335 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
113. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 595 (1965).

107. L.

114. Kimball & Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat
and Response, 14 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 7 (1968)..
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role,"15 since that authority is vested exclusively in the Parole Board. 116
Authority for judicial review of Parole Board discretion is derived from
two sources: traditional administrative law principles 117 and the judicial review provisions of the APA. 118 Embodied in the APA is a strong presumption in favor of review 1 9 which can only be overcome by a clear showing
of contrary legislative intent. 120 Despite the presumption, several courts
have taken a "hands-off" approach,' 2 ' partly because Section 701(A) (2)
of the APA provides: "This chapter [concerning judicial review] applies
according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that . . .agency

action is committed to agency discretion by law.' 122 Since the Board has
discretionary authority granted by statute, it might appear that the Board
was indeed intended to have been exempt. In an apparent contradiction,
however, the same chapter of the APA provides that the reviewing court
shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law .... ,,.

Whether abuse of discretion is reviewable under the APA has been a subject of considerable debate. 2 4 There was a split of authority among the
circuit courts,' 25 but the Supreme Court has recently approved an analysis
favoring review of agency action for abuse of discretion. 126 In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 2 7 the Court made it clear that

115. Thompkins v. United States Bd. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 1968);
Barradale v. United States Bd. of Paroles & Pardons, 362 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D.C.
Penn. 1973).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970).
117. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Jaffe, The Right
to JudicialReview 1,71 I-HARv. L. REV. 401, 432 (1958).
118. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
119. Citizens Comm.for Hudson Valley v.Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1302 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
120. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
121. Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole Process, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 257,
259 (1972); see, e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 236-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1960).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 701(2)(A) (1970).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
124. See generally K. DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTIATrVE LAw TREATISE § 28.08, at 33
(1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 359 (1965); Burger,
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1966); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv.
L. REV. 367-71 (1968).
125. Compare Little v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971) with Ferry v. Udall,
336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965).
126. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v.Volpe, 401 U.S.402, 410 (1971).
127. Id.
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"'committed to agency discretion' . . . is a very narrow exception.' 128 Citing legislative history, the Court prescribed a test limiting the "committed
to agency discretion" exception to "those rare instances where the 'statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' "129 One commentator indicates that "Itlhe difficulty in imagining
such a case leads one to believe that Overton Park's 'no law to apply' test
will require judicial review in all cases where Congress has not explicitly
prohibited it.1BO Cases decided since Overton Park appear to agree ."'
The judicial review provisions of the APA should be applied where arbitrariness in parole decision-making is alleged. The "committed to agency
discretion" provision does not, and never was intended by the legislature,
to preclude judicial review of abuse of discretion. For over 125 years before
the APA was enacted, the Supreme Court declared that "there is no room
for arbitrary action in our system. 13 2 The legislative intent, manifested in
Section 706(2) (a) 33 of the APA, was clearly to continue judicial review
4
in cases of arbitrariness.1
Applying the "Freedom of Information Act"
The provisions of Section 552 of the APA,"13 5 the "Freedom of Information Act," may also be used to combat arbitrariness in parole decision-making. The Parole Board has no apparent exception from Section 552(a)(4)
which provides: "Each agency having more than one member shall maintain and make available for public inspection a record of the final votes of
each member in every agency proceeding." 13 6 Directly contrary to this provision, as well as to a specific Department of Justice regulation,"1 7 the
Board's own rules provide that "[there will be no disclosure of how the
Board or any member votes .
,138 Such a flagrant violation of statu"...
128. Id.at410.
129. Id. at 410, quoting, S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945).
130. McCaba, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Administrative Actions:

A Developmental Note, 24 AD. L. REv. 67, 95 (1972).
131. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 1973); National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.C. Kan. 1973).
132. Burger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 966

n.1O (1969).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
134. See Burger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 966
n.10 (1969) and cases cited therein.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
136. Id. § 552(a)(4). In a similar vein 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) provides that
"[e] ach agency . . . shall make available for public inspection and copying final opinions . . . as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases ....
"

137. 28 C.F.R. § 16.2 (1972). The Parole Board is specifically required to make
the final votes available.
138. U.S. BD. OF PAROLE R. 36 (1971), quoted in Hearings,pt. VII-B at 1308.
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tory law should not go uunchallenged in the courts, particularly since adherence to the rule may benefit the system without unduly burdening the administrative process.
CONCLUSION

Applying various provisions of the APA to the U.S. Board of Parole will
alleviate at least some of the persistent problems confronting the federal parole system. The APA provisions cannot deal with underlying inadequacies
that result from insufficient knowledge of the means by which to effectively
guide complex behavior. Within the confines of present penological knowledge, however, are facts which indicate that application of the APA to the
actions of the U.S. Board of Parole would be beneficial.' 3 9
Despite the need for procedural modifications, federal courts have been
reluctant to oversee the actions of the Parole Board. This "hands-off" attitude has resulted from a genuine belief on the part of courts that punishment
is the best method of protecting society's interests, a belief that parole authorities have greater expertise, an uncertainty as to a prisoner's legal status,
and a fear that complaints from prospective parolees would overburden the
judicial system. Regardless of the reason for minimal judicial intervention,
it is clear that the lack of effective judicial review has not aided the parole
system in rehabilitating offenders.
The courts can improve the parole system's rehabilitative efforts, not by
limiting access to the judicial system, but rather by directing their attention
to the causes of parole problems. "The duty to confront and resolve . . .
140
questions . . . is the very essence of judicial responsibility.'
It is becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. Board of Parole is
an "agency" within the meaning of the APA, despite its contrary position,
and that it -is subject to the requirement for stating reasons for its action
and the provisions for rule-making and judicial review. The over-all quality
of the Board's decisions may be improved if the Board is required to comply
with the APA, in that (1) compliance with the rule making provisions will
result in more knowledgeable public contribution to the establishment of
standards for granting parole; (2) compliance with the requirement of giving
reasons for denial of parole will let the prisoner know why his liberty is restricted, what he may expect in the future and what may be expected of
him as a condition to release in parole; and (3) judicial review will improve
the quality of decision by exposing to public view the occasional decision
made without basis or because of some factors which should not properly
be considered. In the long run, alleviating current parole problems is less
burdensome -than facing those problems later in the form of criminal conduct.
139. See Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 175, 196 (1964).

140. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

